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In its responsive brief, FA TCO makes several arguments, some which it raised 
below and some which it did not. Others address the actual conclusions of the District COUli in 
its decision below and some do not. BOI respectfully submits the following points in reply, 
roughly in the sequential order presented in FA TCO' s brief, which demonstrate that none of the 
arguments raised by FA TCO are persuasive. Accordingly, the District Court's decision should 
be reversed as requested in BO r s opening brief. 
2. ContrarY to F ATCO's assertion, the "natural starting point" for 
analysis in this case is not Section 7, it is instead the grant of coverage afforded to EOI by 
Endorsement 116 to the Policv. 
As a preliminary matter, FA TCO asserts that in determining whether it is liable to 
BOL "the natural starting point" for analysis is Section 7 of the Loan Policy Conditions and 
Stipulations. (Respondent's Brief: p. 7.) BOI respectfully disagrees, and submits that the 
"natural starting point" for any analysis in this case is instead the relevant grant of coverage 
afforded to BOI by the Policy at issue, Endorsement 116, which provides in pertinent part: 
The Company hereby insures the owner of the indebtedness secured by the insured 
mortgage against loss or damage ,vhich the insured shall sustain by reason of the 
failure of (i) a MULTI FAMILY RESIDENCE (description of improvement e.g. "a 
single family residence .') known as 1354 E 16th Street, Idaho Falls, ID 83401 (street 
address), to be located on the land at Date of Policy, or (ii) the map attached to this 
policy to correctly show the location and dimensions of the land according to the public 
records. (Emphasis added in part.) 
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(R. Vol. 2, pp. 457.) This grant of coverage unambiguously and unequivocally "insures" Bor for 
all "loss or damage" which it "shall sustain" because a "multi family residence" was not "located 
on the land. 
In the midst of heated arguments about the meaning and effect of one fine print 
provision of the Policy or another, it is easy to overlook the central importance of this simple, 
broad grant of coverage. It differs markedly from the more traditional coverage usually afforded 
by title insurance. While common, "garden variety" title insurance typically insures only against 
title defects or other issues related to the title to property, Endorsement 116 insures the actual 
physical condition of the land, i.e., whether a building is in fact physically located on the 
property. Thus in one sense, the coverage at issue in this case is more akin to property insurance, 
rather than traditional title insurance insuring title, and might be characterized as a hybrid form of 
insurance. However it is characterized, this difference is important in this case for several 
reasons, discussed at various points below. 
F or example, the coverage afforded by Endorsement 116 distinguishes this case 
from most other title insurance claims litigated across the country, which typically involve 
judicial analysis that is premised on some sort of title defect or other problem with title, and the 
assessment of the consequences thereof. Indeed, FA TCO has failed to point to a single case that 
addresses a..~)r title insurance issue in the context of CO\Terage afforded by Endorsement 116 or its 
equivalent, one way or the other. BOl's nationwide research has likewise failed to reveal such a 
case. Consequently, this case appears to be unique in the annals of appellate jurisprudence, and 
the various analyses conducted by other courts in the context of more common title defect issues 
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may be of limited assistance. In short, this case presents relatively unique questions of first 
impression to this Court for review. 
Likewise, as discussed in BOl's opening brief, the broad terms "loss or damage" 
are undefined by the Policy, and accordingly, must be given their ordinary meaning as applied by 
laymen in daily usage. (Appellant's Brief, p. 22.) As illustrated by the common definitions 
outlined in BOI's opening brief, the "ordinary meaning" of these terms is not limited as to kind 
or type of "loss" or "damage," and therefore far broader than F ATCO often implies or asserts in 
its various arguments. Given the fact that Endorsement 116 insures the actual physical condition 
of the land rather than mere title to the property, it stands to reason that the kinds and types of 
"loss" or "damage" sustained by BOI and therefore potentially recoverable under the coverage 
afforded by this Policy may logically differ from those typically allowed in a garden variety title 
defect case. Accordingly, these distinctions and others make the grant of coverage afforded by 
Endorsement 116 the necessary and "natural starting point" for any analysis in this case, contrary 
to FA TCO's assertion. 
3. Contrary to FATCO's assertion, the District Court did not find that 
BOPs full credit bid was correctly applied as a "payment" on the secured obligation, 
In F ATCO's statement of additional issues presented on appeal, it asserts, as Issue 
The District Court did not err in finding that BOPs full credit bid was correctly 
applied as a payment on the secured obligation and that it satisfied in full any and all 
obligations to BOI with respect to the secured indebtedness. (Emphasis added.) 
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(Respondent's Brief, p.4) As discussed in detail below, much, if not most of F ATCO' s argument 
on appeal is premised on this point, i.e., the notion that BOl's full credit bid should be 
characterized as a "payment" on the secured obligation for purposes of analyzing the various 
provisions in the Policy at issue. 
However, the District COUli made no such finding. Indeed, the Court does not 
employ the word "payment" in its analysis at alL (R., Vol. 2, pp. 458-61.) 
Instead, as discussed at length in BOl's opening brief, the core finding by the 
District Court is its conclusion that BOl's full credit bid at the trustee's sale constituted a 
"voluntary satisfaction or release of the insured mortgage," which completely terminated 
FATCO's liability under Section 9(c) of the Policy. (R., VoL p.460.) In arriving at this 
conclusion, the District Court essentially adopted the argument FA TCO was advancing at the 
time, as the Court itself noted in its decision: "[FATCO] asserts that by reason of the full credit 
bid, there is no loss or damage i.e., the mortgage debt was satisfied with the full credit bid." (R., 
Vol. 2, pp. 458-9.) For the reasons discussed in BOl's opening brief, this core conclusion by the 
District Court, and FATCO's argument to that effect below, are incorrect, and the Court's 
decision must be reversed. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 11-14.) 
FATCO's incorrect assertion that the District Court concluded that BOl's full 
attempt to recast the District Court's conclusion in terms F ATCO views as more favorable to its 
position. As such, it merely indicates FATCO's recognition that the District Court's conclusion 
is flawed. It is nevertheless irrelevant to this Court's review of the District Court's decision. 
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Accordingly, it should be rejected by this Court, as should each of the arguments F ATCO 
attempts to construct on the foundation of that faulty premise. 
4. FATCO's argument that BOl's full credit bid constituted a 
"payment," under Sections 2(c) and 9(b) was neither argued nor decided in the District 
Court, and accordingly, should not be considered bv this Court on appeal. 
As discussed above, the District Court never concluded in the first instance that 
BOI's full credit bid was correctly applied as a "payment" on the on the secured obligation, 
contrary to F ATCO's assertion. 
Nonetheless, FA TCO employs this "payment" rationale to argue for the first time 
on appeal that: 1) because the full credit bid constitutes a "payment," the amount of insurance 
available under Section 2(c) was reduced to zero by BOI's full credit bid, since Section 2(c) 
requires that the amount of insurance be "reduced by the amount of all payments made;" and, 2) 
in similar fashion, Section 9(b) also requires that the amount of insurance be reduced by 
"payments" made, and therefore pursuant to Section 7(a)(ii) the amount of insurance is also 
reduced to zero. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 10-13.) 
However, FA TCO did not raise the applicability of either Section 2( c) or Section 
9(b) in the District Court, in the manner it now argues on appeal. There is no such argument in 
District Court did not address or decide anything with respect to Section 2( c) or Section 9(b) in 
its analysis. (R., Vol. 2, pp. 458-61.) 
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It is axiomatic that this Court will not consider arguments raised for the first time 
on appeal. See, e,g, Duspiva v, Fillmore, 154 Idaho 27, ,293 PJd 651,657 (2013) 
(Argument that federal standard applied not considered on appeal when not asserted in briefing 
to the district court.). Instead, appellate court review is limited to the evidence, theories and 
arguments that were presented below, and appellate courts will not consider new arguments on 
appeal. See, e,g, Obenchain v, It,1cAlvain Construction, Inc., 143 Idaho 56,57, 137 P.3d 443, 
444 (2006) (Argument that untimely appeal was caused by postal enor not considered when not 
raised below.). 
BOI respectfully submits that in conformity with this longstanding rule, F ATCO's 
new arguments regarding the alleged effect of Sections 2( c) and 9(b), which are raised for the 
first time on appeal here, should likewise be disregarded by this Court. 
FATCO's attempt to re-characterize BOl's full credit bid as a 
"payment" rather than a "satisfaction or release" of the secured obligation, as the District 
Court concluded, is a distinction without a difference. Regardless of how it is 
characterized, Idaho law does not permit FATCO to employ BOPs full credit bid as a 
defense to liability under the Policy, 
F ATCO next argues that "]i]t is well established that a lender's credit bid at a 
policy concerns regarding "the integrity of non-judicial foreclosure sales" would be undermined 
if that was not the case. (Respondent' Brief, pp. 13-15.) Based on this premise, FA TCO argues 
that it too is entitled to characterize BOI's full credit bid as a "payment" and thereby employ it to 
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avoid liability under the Policy, reiterating its position that as a "payment," BOI's full credit bid 
reduces the amount of insurance to zero. (Respondent' Brief, p. 18.) 
However, F ATCO simply misapprehends the limitation imposed by Idaho law on 
the use of a full credit bid to avoid liability. As discussed at length in BOl's opening brief, the 
full credit bid rule is a creature of the anti-deficiency provisions contained in statutes governing 
non~judicial foreclosures, which are designed to protect borrowers/grantors on a secured 
obligation, not a title insurer like F ATCO. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 14-19) As such, Idaho law 
precludes FA TCO from asserting BOI's full credit bid as a defense to liability because it is not a 
borrower/grantor on a secured obligation, as the Court of Appeal's decision in Willis v. Realty 
Country, Inc., 121 Idaho 312, 316-7, 824 P.2d 887, 891 (App. 1991) (pet. rev. denied, February 
28, 1992), and this Court's decision in First Security Bank of Idaho, NA. v. Gaige. 115 Idaho 
172, 174, 765 P.2d 683, 685 (1988), collectively hold. 
This is so regardless of whether one characterizes the full credit bid as a 
"payment, as F ATCO now attempts to do, or as a "satisfaction or release" of the secured 
obligation, as the District Court did below. Either way, the fact of BOl's full credit bid is simply 
not available to FA TCO, and cannot be employed as a defense to liability under the Policy. 
The full credit bid rule is a judicially created legal fiction designed to protect 
Kolodge v. Boyd, 105 Cal Rptr. 2d 749. 755 (lSI Dist 2001), the court recognized this fact in its 
discussion of the rationale behind California's full credit bid rule, noting that it is a legal fiction 
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which serves the debtor protection policies behind California's anti-deficiency statute in the 
context of a lender/debtor relationship: 
Acknowledging the interrelationship between foreclosure and antideficiency statutes 
[citation omitted] the Supreme Court designed the full credit bid rule to ensure the 
integrity of nonjudicial foreclosure sales insofar as such sales may relate to the 
debtor protection policies of the antideficiency statutes. The rule makes a properly 
conducted nonjudicial foreclosure sale the dispositive device through which to " 'resolve 
the question of value and the question of potential forfeiture through competitive 
bidding .... ' " [citation omitted] A lender who enters a full credit bid is deemed to have 
irrevocably warranted that the value of the security foreclosed upon was equal to the 
outstanding indebtedness and not impaired. [citation omitted] Because the secured 
obligation has been totally satisfied, there is no deficiency that can be sued upon. The 
effect of the rule is to foreclose claims against the borrower that might be allowed by the 
anti deficiency statutes, such as a claim for bad faith waste, if the measure of damages 
sought is the amount of the alleged impairment of the lender's security. 
It is necessary to keep in mind that the idea that the full credit bid 
a constitutes an admission as to the genuine of 
property-is a legal fiction. As the United States Supreme Court has pointed out, 
bids at foreclosure sales often bear little relationship to the fair market value of 
security property [citation omitted] [" 'fair market value' presumes market conditions 
that, by definition, simply do not obtain in the context of a forced sale."].) While the 
fiction serves a useful purpose as between a lender and a borrower, because it is a 
useful way in which to enforce the policies reflected in the antideficiency statutes, it 
can be very troublesome when applied in other contexts, as this case shows. 
(Emphasis Added.) 
Kolodge. 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 755. 
Idaho appellate courts have gone even further and simply adopted a bright line 
rule that the protections afforded by Idaho's anti-deficiency statute, and the full credit bid rule 
embodied therein, do not extend to anyone except the borrower/grantor on a secured obligation, 
as reflected in the decisions in Gaige and Willis. Idaho is not alone in this approach. See, 
Glenham v. Palzer, 792 P.2d 551 (Wa. App. 1990)(action by secured creditors against third 
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parties who were not obligors under loan agreement relating to foreclosed debt not precluded by 
full credit bid) 
Moreover, FA TCO' s expressed concern regarding the undermining of "the 
integrity of non-judicial foreclosure sales" is ironic in the extreme, as is its repeated insistence 
that it has not invoked the protection ofIdaho's anti-deficiency statute in this case. (See, e.g., 
Respondent's Brief, p. 1 By asserting BOl's full credit bid to avoid liability, that is precisely 
what it has done, because the full credit bid rule only exists in thc context ofIdaho's anti-
deficiency statute in the first instance. 
In addition. none of the cases FA TCO relies on require a different analysis. The 
only Idaho case cited, Fed. Home Loan A1ortg. Corp. v. Appel, 143 Idaho 42, 137 P.3d 429 
(2006). arose in the context of a lender's action to eject the borrowers/grantors from the secured 
property after a trustee's sale, and the discussion regarding credit bids arose in the context of 
deciding whether or not a credit bid, as opposed to a cash bid, was permissible pursuant to 
Idaho's deed of trust foreclosure statutes. Appel, 143 Idaho at 43-4,137 P.3d at 431-2. 
Accordingly, Appel does nothing to disturb the decisions in Gaige and Willis, and consequently, 
it provides no support to FA TCO' s position here. Likewise, the other two out of state cases cited 
by FATCO, Alliance Mortg. Co. v. Rothwell, 900 P.2d 601 (Cal. 1995) and J..,1&1 Bank, FSB. v. 
in Gaige and Willis. 
Finally, FA TCO' s attempt to distinguish Gaige and Willis is unpersuasive. 
F ATCO simply asserts that neither Gaige nor Willis supports the notion that a lender's credit bid 
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should not be applied as a "payment" on the secured indebtedness. (Respondent's Brief, p.16) 
However as discussed above, the fact ofBOl's full credit bid is simply not available to FATCO 
as a defense to liability under Idaho law because it is not a borrower/grantor on a secured 
obligation. That is true regardless of whether one characterizes a credit bid as a "payment" or as 
a "satisfaction or release" of the secured obligation. 
6, F ATCO's attempt to rebut BOPs position that the District Court 
erred in its analysis of Section 7(a)(ii) and its conclusion regarding the time at which BOPs 
"loss or damage" first "occurred" is unpersuasive, 
In the final section ofFATCO's substantive argument, it attempts to rebut BOI's 
position, discussed at length in pages 19-24 of its opening brief, that the District Court erred in 
its analysis of Section 7(a)(ii), erred in concluding that the foreclosure sale was the first point in 
time that "loss or damage" could "occur," and erred in equating the time that such "loss or 
damage" "occurs" with the time that the amount of such losses might ultimately be "determined. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 19-24, Respondent's Brief, p. 19-24.) 
F ATCO first responds by asserting that even if one assumes BOI incurred "loss or 
damage" as a result of the failure to locate a four-plex on Lot 1, that "supposed loss or damage 
was mitigated to zero at the foreclosure sale when the debt secured by the insured deed of trust 
,~v~s paid in full." (Respondent's Brief~ p. 19-24.) 
However, FA TCO' s response only demonstrates its misconception of the District 
Court's decision, and BOI's resulting position that the Court erred in concluding that the time of 
the foreclosure sale is the first point at which loss or damage "occurred" for purposes of 
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determining when to measure the amount of the debt pursuant to Section 7(a)(ii). In other words, 
the pertinent question under Section 7(a)(ii) is not whether the loss or damage was subsequently 
"mitigated to zero" by Bor s full credit bid at the foreclosure sale, or for that matter, even 
whether such "loss or damage" may ultimately be recovered by BOL It is instead the following 
question: at what point in time did "loss or damage" "insured against" by Endorsement 116 first 
"occur?" 
As discussed at length in BOl's opening brief, the factual record before the Court 
amply demonstrates that significant "loss or damage," as those terms are commonly defined and 
employed in Endorsement 116, which included actual, out-of-pocket expenses, first "occurred" 
long before the foreclosure sale, at a time when, for purposes of Section 7( a)(ii), the "unpaid 
principal on the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage ... , together with interest thereon" 
was far in excess of $200,000.00. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 22-24.) At a minimum, the factual 
record before the Court creates material issues of fact in that regard, which make summary 
judgment inappropriate. 
Next, F ATCO insists that BOl's position "reflects a fundamental 
misunderstanding" of the nature of the coverage afforded by a lender's policy, and quotes at 
length from a number of cases in other jurisdictions and one treatise, in an apparent attempt to 
support its position that only a "loan loss" is insured under a lender's policy of title insurance. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp. 19-22.) 
However, F ATCO fails to support that argument with any reference to the 
language contained in this Policy. As discussed both above and below, the "loss or damage" 
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insured against by Endorsement 116 is clearly not so limited, to a "loan loss" or otherwise. 
Instead, those terms are undefined by the Policy, and accordingly must be given their ordinary 
meaning as applied by laymen in daily usage, for purposes of analyzing Endorsement 116 and 
Section 7(a)(ii). 
Moreover, several of the authorities FA TeO relies on do not actually supp0l1 
F ATeO' s position, and all are readily distinguishable from this case. In the first instance, none 
involve a lender's policy which includes a grant of coverage like that afforded to BOI by 
Endorsement 116, or its equivalent. As discussed above, the coverage afforded by Endorsement 
116 differs markedly from "garden variety" title insurance, which typically only insures against 
defects in title and the like, while Endorsement 116 insures the actual physical condition of the 
land. Likewise, no case addresses the nature of "loss or damage" as those terms are commonly 
defined for purposes of Endorsement 116 and Section 7(a)(ii), and none interprets the meaning 
and etTect of either provision. 
The authorities cited by FATeo are summarized in its quote from Palomar's 
Treatise, which FA TeO emphasizes as follows: 
[I]n the context of an owner's policy, the insured sustains a "loss" when the 
existence of a title problem reduces the fair market value of the insured 
interest; conversely, in the context of a loan polkv, the insured generally has 
no compensable "loss," despite the existence of a title problem, unless the loan 
is not repaid and, as a result of the title problem, the lender receives less for the 
land than the amount of the debt. In other words, existing case law almost 
unanimously holds that an insured owner has a loss as soon as its legal rights 
in the property are diminished, without an out-of-pocket cost; but a lender has 
no loss until it sustains an out-of-pocket loss. This distinction is expressly 
made in the cases of Green v. Evesham Corp., Blackhawk Production Credit 
Ass'n v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., CMEI, Inc. v. American Title Ins. Co. 
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Joyce Palomar, Title Ins. Law § 6:20 (2011) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
(Respondent's Brief, pp. 21-2.) 
The quoted language that FA TCO emphasizes makes clear that Palomar is 
addressing traditional title insurance that only insures title, not the coverage afforded to BOI in 
this case by Endorsement 116. More importantly, the emphasized language actually supports 
BOrs position, not FATCO's. It is clearly addressing the question of whether an insured lender 
has suffered a loss that is "compensable" under a lender's policy, not the pertinent question here, 
\vhich is the time at which "loss or damage" has "occurred" for purposes of Section 7(a)(ii) and 
Endorsement 116. Finally, it confirms that a lender suffers a "loss" when it sustains out-of-
pocket loss. As discussed above, the record in this case clearly demonstrates the BOI sustained 
out-of-pocket losses long before the foreclosure sale. In short, nothing in the quote from Palomar 
or the other cases cited by FA TCO refutes BOl's position. 
~ext, based on the authorities it cites, F ATCO argues that there are two 
indispensable prerequisites to "recovery" under a lender's title policy: 1) the existence of an 
"insured defect;" and, 2) a "loan loss" resulting from the "insured defect." It asserts that if either 
prerequisite is missing, there is no "loss" or "damage" within the "indemnity" of the policy. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp. 22-23.) It concludes by asserting that none of the issues discussed in 
BOI's opening brief, such as a diminution in value of the collateral, the inability to market the 
insured deed of trust on the secondary market, a default by the borrowers, or the necessity of 
foreclosure "are defects insured under the Loan Policy." (Respondent's Brief, p. 23.) 
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However, none of the language quoted by FA TCO from the authorities it cites 
states that a "loan loss" is required, or even addresses the meaning of that term. Moreover, as 
discussed both above and below, the question of whether or not a "recovery" may be had is 
simply irrelevant to the question at hand. 
More importantly, FATCO's discussion reflects its apparent confusion as to the 
distinction between the risk insured against, the "defect" in FA TCO' s parlance, and a "loss" 
caused by that "defect." There is no dispute that the "defect" insured against in this case is the 
risk that a building was not physically located on Lot 1. As discussed above, the grant of 
coverage afforded to BOl by Endorsement 116 unambiguously and unequivocally "insures" BOl 
for all "loss or damage" which it "shall sustain" because a "multi family residence" was not 
"located on the land," and there is no dispute that there was no building on the insured parcel. 
As also discussed above and in BOl's opening brief, the broad terms "loss or 
damage" are undefined by the Policy, and accordingly, they must be given their ordinary meaning 
as applied by laymen in daily usage. See, e.g. Armstrong v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 147 Idaho 
67, 71,205 P.3d 1203, 1207 (2009). As illustrated by the common definitions outlined in BOl's 
opening brief, the "ordinary meaning" of these terms is not limited in terms of the kind or type. 
Consequently, the "loss" or "damage" is not limited to a "loan loss" under the coverage afforded 
by Endorsement 116, COl1tral)T to F i\. Teo' s rel)C~:ted assertion. 
Moreover, no other provision of the Policy at issue here limits the terms "loss or 
damage" to a "loan loss" as F ATCO suggests. The sole constraint on the "loss or damage" that is 
recoverable under the Policy is contained in the first sentence of Section 7, which provides: 
14 
This policy is a contract of indemnity against actual monetary loss or damage 
sustained or incurred by the insured claimant who has suffered loss or damage by 
reason of the matters insured against by this policy and only to the extent herein 
described. (Emphasis added.) 
CR. Vol. 2, p. 455.) 
This provision says nothing about the term "loss or damage" being limited to a 
"loan loss." Moreover, it draws the clear distinction between the generic manner in which the 
term "loss or damage" is employed in Endorsement 116 and Section 7(a)(ii), and the type of 
"loss or damage" that is ultimately recoverable under the Policy, i.e., "actual monetary loss or 
damage. In other words, the provision explicitly recognizes that an "insured claimant" may 
suffer generic "loss or damage" as a result of "matters insured against" by the Policy for purposes 
of Endorsement 116 and Section 7(a)(ii), but that such generic "loss or damage" may only be 
recoverable to the extent it constitutes "actual monetary loss or damage." 
Consequently, this provision only provides further support for BOl's position that 
the record before the Court amply demonstrates that it sustained "loss or damage" for purposes of 
Endorsement 116 and Section 7(a)(ii) long before the foreclosure sale took place, contrary to 
FA TCO' s arguments and the District Court's decision. 
Finally, F ATCO argues that whatever losses "Bor supposedly incurred" prior to 
the foreclosure sale, they were "mitigated in full" at the foreclosure sale by its full credit bid. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp. 22-23.) 
However, this argument again illustrates FA TCO' s misconception of the District 
Court's decision, and BOl's position that the Court erred in its analysis with respect to when 
"loss or damage" first "occurred" for purposes of Section 7(a)(ii). As discussed above, the 
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pertinent question under Section 7(a)(ii) is not whether the loss or damage was subsequently 
"mitigated in full" by BOl's full credit bid, but instead when did "loss or damage" "insured 
against" by Endorsement 116 first "occur?" 
In short, none of FA TCO' s arguments in support of the District Court's decision 
regarding Section 7(a)(ii) and the time at which BOI's "loss or damage" first "occurred" are 
persuasive, the District Court's decision in that regard is incorrect, and it should accordingly be 
reversed for the reasons discussed above and in BOl's opening brief. 
7. BOPs appeal is not frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation, 
and accordingly, FATCO is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees on appeal, 
FA TCO asserts that it is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs on appeal 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-123, Idaho Code § 41-1839(4) and lv10rtensen v. Stewart Title Guar. 
Co., 149 Idaho 437, 447, 235 P.3d 387,397 (2010). It contends it is entitled to such an award 
because BOl's appeal is frivolous, unreasonable and without foundation. It bases that contention 
on the argument that BOI has not introduced any arguments or cited any authority not already 
considered and disposed of by the District Court, and therefore, BOI is only asking this Court to 
reach a different conclusion. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 24-25.) 
Nothing could be further from the truth. In lHortensen. this Court upheld the trial 
Idaho Code §§ 41-1839 and 12-123 are the exclusive remedies for obtaining attorney 
fees in disputes arising out of insurance policies. I.C. § 41-1839(4). The district court 
awarded $25,000 in attorney fees to Stewart Title pursuant to § 41-1839(4), which 
permits such an award in suits over insurance policies when the court finds "that a case 
was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." 
Although § 41-1839 does not clarify what cases would be unreasonable or frivolous, this 
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Court has many times addressed I.e. § 12-121, a similar provision that permits fee 
awards in frivolous or meritless cases. Under I.C. § 12-121, "[i]fthere is a legitimate, 
triable issue of fact or a legitimate issue of law, attorney fees may not be awarded." 
Kieber! v. Goss, 144 Idaho 225, 228,159 P.3d 862,865 (2007). "[W]hether a statute 
awarding attorney's fees applies to a given set of facts is a question oflaw" subject to free 
review. Ransom v, Topaz Mktg, 143 Idaho 641, 644,152 P.3d 2,5 (2006). 
The district court's award was proper because Mortensen never raised any triable 
issues of fact. Mortensen raised an emotional-distress claim and a claim for breach 
of contract for Stewart Title's refusal to defend his appeal in the face of 
contract language permitting to limit on his 
policy instead of pursuing his appeal. Mortensen also did not attempt to offer any 
factual evidence to support his claims that Stewart Title acted without diligence or 
bad faith when it sought to obtain for him an ownership interest in the access 
road, even though he demanded that Stewart Title do something to ensure he had an 
easement there. The award for attorney fees below pursuant to I.e. § 41-1839(4) is 
therefore affirmed. (Emphasis added.) 
Mortensen, 149 Idaho at 447,235 P.3d at 397. Upon further review, this Court also decided to 
award fees on appeal for the same reasons, despite the fact that the respondent's request for fees 
on appeal was not ideal: 
As stated above, I.e. § 41-1839(4) authorizes an award of attorney fees ifan appeal is 
brought frivolously. Again, Mortensen is merely asking this Court to second-guess the 
district court's ruling despite unambiguous controlling language in the insurance policy. 
After reviewing the briefing on the petition for rehearing, the Court awards attorney fees 
on appeal in this substitute opinion. See Elec, Wholesale Supply Co, v, Nielson, 136 Idaho 
814,828,41 P.3d 242, 256 (2001) (awarding fees where the appellant "failed to 
present a meaningful issue on a question of law"). Therefore, no rehearing is 
necessary. Stewart Title's petition for rehearing is denied. (Emphasis added.) 
Mortensen, 149 Idaho at 448,235 P.3d at 398. 
Unlike the appellant in 1'v1ortensen, BOI presents perfectly legitimate and 
important questions of law to this Court regarding the proper interpretation and effect of the 
Policy language at issue which are questions of first impression for this Court. It also presents a 
perfectly legitimate question of whether FA TCO can employ the full credit bid rule to avoid 
17 
liability, given existing Idaho law which holds that it cannot. Likewise, BOI has presented 
genuine issues of fact regarding the nature, extent and timing of "loss" or "damage" it has 
sustained, as the District Court itself acknowledged, though it found those genuine issues to be 
immaterial in light of its legal conclusions. (R. Vol. 2, p. 461) 
The mere fact that the District Court incorrectly rejected BOl's arguments does 
not render them frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation. Indeed, if that was the case, one 
could never appeal an adverse summary judgment determination without fearing an award of fees 
on appeal. Accordingly, an award of fees to F ATCO is clearly improper, regardless of the 
outcome of this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For each of the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons discussed in its opening 
brief, BOI respectfully requests that this Court reverse the District Court's decision, and remand 
this action to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with the Court's decision. 
DATED this 21 st day of November, 2013. 
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